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Abstract	
The	European	Court	of	 Justice	has	played	a	pivotal	 role	 in	 the	 transformation	of	 international	 law	
obligations	between	Member	States	into	an	integrated	legal	order	with	direct	applicability	and	effect	
in	those	Member	States.	This	article	explores	whether	or	not	the	ECJ	continues	to	be	relevant	to	EU	
governance	and	integration	and	whether	it	continues	to	transform	the	legal	orders	of	the	Member	
States.	It	briefly	outlines	the	early	case	law	which	transformed	the	legal	order,	and	the	preliminary	
reference	procedure	as	an	important	element	of	that	transformation,	and	then	considers	the	extent	
to	which	 the	ECJ	continues	 to	act	 in	ways	which	are	 transformational	even	though	the	 legal	order	
itself	has	remained	relatively	static.	The	EU	citizenship	 jurisprudence	serves	as	a	useful	example	of	
how	 integration	 is	 driven	 forward	 by	 the	 Court.	 This	 article	 argues	 that	 the	 Court’s	 decisions	 do	
continue	 to	 have	 significant	 impact	 on	 areas	 of	 law	 and	 policy	 and	 EU	 governance	 generally.	 It	
illustrates	 this	 argument	 using	 gender	 equality	 law	 and	 Human	 Rights	 as	 pertinent	 examples	 and	
concludes	 that	 the	 ECJ	 remains	 relevant	 in	 governance	 terms	 as	 it	 continues	 to	 drive	 forward	 EU	
integration	 in	 many	 areas	 and	 influence	 the	 development	 of	 law	 and	 policy	 across	 the	 Member	
States.	
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The	European	Court	of	Justice	(ECJ)1	has	played	a	pivotal	role	in	the	transformation	of	international	
law	obligations	between	Member	States	into	an	integrated	legal	order	with	direct	applicability	and	
effect	 in	 those	Member	 States.	While	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	 literature	 has	 been	 devoted	 to	 the	
Court’s	jurisprudence	and	key	decisions	have	been	analysed	in	detail	 in	the	legal	literature,	the	ECJ	
has	 received	 relatively	 little	attention	 from	a	political	or	governance	perspective.2	 The	article	 thus	
begins	 with	 a	 brief	 assessment	 of	 the	 early	 case	 law	 which	 transformed	 the	 treaties	 into	 an	
integrated	legal	order	applicable	directly	in	Member	States	and	argues	that	without	these	decisions	
EU	governance	would	look	very	different	today.	The	focus	on	case	law	is	important	as	it	 is	through	
the	 case	 law	 of	 the	 ECJ	 that	 we	 are	 able	 to	 interpret	 the	 Court’s	 intentions.	 Unlike	 other	 EU	
institutions,	the	Court	cannot	set	out	 its	policy	priorities	or	the	direction	it	wishes	to	go	in.	 It	must	
remain	silent	about	any	designs	or	priorities	it	may	have	and	speak	through	its	legal	decisions.	Those	
decisions	are	then	open	to	interpretation	by	commentators	who	must	try	and	deduce	the	extent	to	
which	the	ECJ	does	indeed	have	a	grand	plan	and	what	that	plan	is.	
The	role	and	status	of	the	ECJ	is,	however,	affected	by	more	than	its	decision	making	and	judgments	
and	this	article	considers	why	Member	States	have	not	only	accepted	the	legal	order	as	created	by	
the	 ECJ	 but	 also	 its	 case	 law	 more	 generally	 and	 why,	 rather	 than	 curbing	 the	 Court’s	 power,	
Member	 States	 have	 instead	 allowed	 it	 to	 expand	 into	more	 and	more	 areas.	 Finally,	 the	 article	
																																								 																				
1	Now	of	course	it	is	more	accurate	to	refer	to	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	as	an	umbrella	term	covering	the	
ECJ,	 the	General	 Court	 and	 specialist	 tribunals.	 For	 ease	 of	 reference,	 the	 term	 ECJ	 is	 used	 throughout	 this	 article	 and	
although	this	is	mostly	accurate,	it	is	acknowledged	that	the	exact	meaning	of	that	term	has	changed	over	time.	
2	 There	 are	 of	 course	 notable	 exceptions	 such	 as	 Karen	 Alter,	 The	 European	 Court’s	 Political	 Power.	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	
University	Press,	2009)	and	more	recently	Mark	Dawson,	Bruno	DeWitte	and	Elise	Muir,	Judicial	Activism	at	the	European	
Court	of	Justice	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar,	2013).	
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considers	whether	the	transformative	nature	of	the	Court’s	decisions	is	limited	to	those	early	cases	
or	whether	 it	 has	 continued	 to	 change	 the	 legal	 and	 political	 landscape.	 Although	 the	 legal	 order	
itself	has	remained	fairly	static	following	the	early	transformation,	the	Court	remains	active	and	has	
continued	 to	make	 decisions	which	 transform	 certain	 policy	 areas	 and	 embrace	 certain	modes	 of	
governance.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	Court	 assumes	 a	 position	of	 authority	 and	power	 in	 the	 institutional	
framework	which	supports	and	encourages	increasing	judicialisation	of	the	EU.	
 
TRANSFORMING	THE	LEGAL	ORDER	
The	role	of	the	ECJ	in	shaping	the	EU	as	we	know	it	today	should	not	be	underestimated.	The	EU	is	
very	much	based	upon	legal	documents,	legal	principles,	the	rule	of	law	and	the	workings	of	the	ECJ.	
It	is	a	Union	for	lawyers	characterised	by	an	increase	in	legal	actions	brought	to	the	EU	by	EU	citizens	
represented	 by	 EU	 law	 specialist	 lawyers,	 and	 this	 increasing	 role	 of	 lawyers	 and	 Courts	 in	 the	
regulation	of	EU	matters	is	seen	by	some	to	be	a	move	towards	American	style	adversarial	legalism,	
with	 the	 emergent	 version	 in	 the	 EU	 being	 termed	 as	 Eurolegalism.3	 Eurolegalism,	 so	 Kelemen	
argues,	 is	 the	 result	 of	 fragmented	 governmental	 and	 economic	 power	 and	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 far	more	
important	mode	of	governance	in	the	EU	than	so-called	modes	of	new	governance	which	are	dealt	
with	in	detail	by	both	Michelle	Cini	and	Ingeborg	Tömmel4	in	their	contributions	to	this	special	issue.	
Whether	 or	 not	 Kelemen‘s	 view	 is	 justified	 is	 open	 for	 debate,	 but	 his	 argument	 does	 raise	 the	
question	of	how	a	set	of	treaties	setting	out	international	law	obligations	between	signatory	states	
became	 a	 situation	 where	 the	 legal	 order	 has	 been	 so	 transformed	 that	 judicialisation	 of	 EU	
regulation	and	governance	is	commonplace.	
Early	analyses	place	the	Court	firmly	at	the	centre	of	the	EU’s	legal	universe,	seeing	it	as	a	key	player	
shaping	law	and	legal	development.	Other	commentators	sideline	the	Court	as	an	institution	merely	
doing	the	bidding	of	the	most	powerful	Member	States	and	thus	as	an	institution	which	is	inherently	
governed	 by	 politics	 rather	 than	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 The	 exchange	 between	 Garrett5	 and	 Mattli	 &	
Slaughter6	sets	out	the	arguments	for	those	respective	positions	clearly	but,	as	Karen	Alter7	notes,	
there	 now	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 consensus	 that	 the	 truth	 lies	 somewhere	 between	 those	 two	positions;	
with	 the	 Court	 having	 significant	 autonomy	 without	 being	 immune	 to	 political	 processes	 and	
Member	State	or	EU	institutional	interests.		
Principles	which	are	key	to	the	functioning	of	the	EU	legal	order	as	we	now	know	it	cannot	be	found	
in	 the	 Treaties,	 certainly	 not	 the	 early	 ones	 as	 Shaw	 notes:	 ‘[The	 Treaty	 provisions]	 give	 no	 hint,	
however,	that	the	obligations	undertaken	by	the	Member	States	under	the	Treaties	they	have	signed	
are	 relevant	 at	 any	 level	 other	 than	 that	 of	 international	 law’.8	 Fennelly	 makes	 the	 same	 point,	
																																								 																				
3	Daniel	R.	 Kelemen,	 Eurolegalism	The	Transformation	of	 Law	and	Regulation	 in	 the	European	Union,	 (London:	Harvard	
University	Press,	2011).	
4	Michelle	Cini,	 ‘Good	Governance	and	 Institutional	Change:	Administrative	Ethics	Reform	in	the	European	Commission’,	
Journal	of	Contemporary	European	Research,	 12(1)	 (2016):	 440-454;	 Ingeborg	Tömmel,	 ‘EU	Governance	of	Governance:	
Political	Steering	in	a	Non-Hierarchical	Multilevel	System’,	Journal	of	Contemporary	European	Research,	12(1)	(2016):	406-
423.	
5	Geoffrey	Garrett,	‘The	Politics	of	Legal	Integration	in	the	European	Union,’	International	Organization,	49(1)	(1995):	171–
81.	
6	Walter	Mattli	 and	 Anne-Marie	 Slaughter	 ‘Law	 and	 Politics	 in	 the	 European	 Union:	 A	 Reply	 to	 Garrett,’	 International	
Organization,	49(1)	(1995):	183–90.	
7	Alter,	The	European	Court’s	Political	Power.	
8	Jo	Shaw,	Law	of	the	European	Union.	Third	Edition,	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave,	2000).	
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recognising	the	role	of	the	ECJ	at	the	same	time:	‘The	treaties	did	not	provide	for	direct	effect,	still	
less	for	supremacy.	They	established	the	Court	of	Justice,	which	filled	the	gap’.9	
In	hindsight,	it	is	easy	to	say	that	the	development	of	EU	law	was	inevitable	but	this	is	too	simplistic.	
While	Shaw	notes	that	the	Court	‘has	consistently	given	a	maximalist	interpretation	of	the	authority	
and	effect	of	EU	law	…	to	ensure	that	‘the	law	is	observed’’,10	Alter	points	out	that	‘the	ECJ’s	agency	
matters	–	the	ECJ	can	choose	to	play	a	minimalist	role,	interpreting	law	narrowly	and	even	illogically	
when	there	is	little	social	support	for	the	law	it	is	asked	to	apply’.11	Furthermore,	‘there	is	no	set	of	
unidirectional	hypotheses	that	predicts	when,	why	and	how	the	ECJ	will	be	activist	or	influential’.12	
Nonetheless	it	is	clear	that	the	ECJ	has	been	‘legally	audacious	[and]	politically	successful	in	altering	
so	completely	the	terrain	in	which	[it]	operate[s]’.13	
The	 case	 of	 Van	 Gend	 en	 Loos14	 is	 a	 ‘famous	 stepping	 stone	 of	 legal	 doctrine,	 but	 [also]	 a	
breakthrough	in	the	political	relationship	between	member	states	and	the	club’15		as	it	turned	what	
was	 for	 all	 intents	 and	 purposes	 an	 international	 legal	 framework	 into	 a	 new	 legal	 order	 which	
applied	not	only	at	international	level	between	Member	States	but	also	to	citizens	of	those	Member	
States.	 In	 1964,	 the	 Court	 built	 further	 on	 its	 decision	 in	 Van	 Gend	 and	 the	 ideas	 of	 direct	
applicability	(that	is	the	legal	mechanism	that	the	EU	Treaties	and	Regulations	apply	in	all	Member	
States	 without	 the	 need	 to	 be	 transposed	 into	 national	 law)	 and	 direct	 effect	 (that	 is	 the	 legal	
mechanism	 that	 individuals	 can	 rely	 directly	 on	EU	 law	 in	 their	 national	 Courts	 to	 enforce	 EU	 law	
rights	granted	to	 them)	established	 in	 it	by	clarifying	 the	principle	of	 supremacy	 in	Costa	v	ENEL16	
and	then	Internationale	Handelsgesellschaft:	‘The	law	born	from	the	Treaty	[cannot]	have	the	Courts	
opposing	to	it	rules	of	national	law	of	any	nature	whatsoever…’.17	The	cases	‘represented,	not	just	in	
their	time	but	permanently,	a	giant	 leap	on	the	road	to	European	integration’.18	 In	Francovich	and	
Bonifaci	v	Italy	the	ECJ	went	further:	
It	must	be	held	that	the	full	effectiveness	of	Community	rules	would	be	impaired	and	
the	protection	of	 the	rights	which	they	grant	would	be	weakened	 if	 individuals	were	
unable	 to	 obtain	 compensation	 when	 their	 rights	 are	 infringed	 by	 a	 breach	 of	
Community	law	for	which	a	Member	State	can	be	held	responsible.19	
By	the	1990s	therefore,	the	Member	States	had	been	‘judicially	tamed’20	and	the	ECJ	had	completed	
the	transformation	of	 the	treaties	 ‘from	a	set	of	horizontal	 legal	arrangements	between sovereign	
states	into	a	vertically	integrated	legal	regime	conferring judicially	enforceable	rights	and	obligations	
on	all	legal	persons	and	entities,	public	and	private,	within	the	EC	territory’.21  
																																								 																				
9	Nial	Fennelly	‘The	European	Court	of	Justice	and	the	Doctrine	of	Supremacy:	Van	Gend	en	Loos;	Costa	v	ENEL;	Simmethal’	
in,	Miguel	P	Maduro,	and	Loic	Azoulai	(eds),	The	Past	and	Future	of	EU	Law,	(Oxford:	Hart	Publishing,	2010),	at	39-46.	
10	Shaw,	Law	of	the	European	Union.	
11	Alter,	The	European	Court’s	Political	Power.	
12	ibid,	at	4.	
13	Karen	Alter,	The	European	Court’s	Political	Power,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009),	at	5.	
14	Case	26/62	Van	Gend	en	Loos	[1963]	ECR	1.	
15	Luuk	Van	Middelaar,	The	Passage	to	Europe.	Translated	by	Liz	Waters.	(London:	Yale	University	Press,	2013),	at	49.	
16	Case	6/64	Case	Costa	v	ENEL	[1964]	ECR	585.	
17	Case	C-11/70,	Internationale	Handelsgesellschaft	[1970]	ECR	1125.	
18	Fennelly,	‘The	European	Court	of	Justice	and	the	Doctrine	of	Supremacy’.		
19	Case	6&9/90	Francovich	and	Bonifaci	v	Italy	[1990]	ECR	I-5357at	5415.	
20	Van	Middelaar,	The	Passage	to	Europe,	at	80.	
21 Alec	 Stone	 Sweet	 ‘Constitutional	 Dialogues	 in	 the	 European	 Community’	 ,in	Marie	 Slaughter,	 Alec	 Stone	 Sweet	 and	
Joseph	H.	H.	Weiler	(eds)	,The	European	Courts	and	National	Courts:	Doctrine	and	Jurisprudence,	(Oxford:	Hart	Publishing,	
1999),	at	305-330. 
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In	doing	so,	the	ECJ	reserved	for	itself	the	power	to	define	key	concepts	which	impact	on	governance	
at	EU	and	Member	State	levels.	Governance	competence	is	shifted	away	from	Member	States	whose	
laws	must	now	comply	with	the	interpretation	of	EU	law	by	the	ECJ.	Although	Tömmel	in	this	issue	
points	out	that	procedural	avenues	are	often	shaped	using	Directives	and	Regulations,	the	ECJ	also	
has	a	role	to	play	in	second	order	governance22	and	these	cases	set	the	foundations	for	that.	They	
also,	 of	 course,	 set	 the	 foundations	 for	 increasing	 judicialisation	 of	 EU	 policymaking	 and	 are	
instrumental	 in	 shaping	 modes	 of	 governance.	 Tömmel	 notes	 that	 the	 EU	 builds	 a	 system	 of	
‘governance	 of	 governance’;	 the	 ECJ,	 through	 its	 early	 case	 law,	 ensured	 that	 the	 system	 is	 one	
which	remains	open	to	judicial	scrutiny.		
It	 is	difficult	 to	know	whether	 the	 transformation	of	 the	 legal	order	and	 its	 impact	on	governance	
was	 intentional	or	accidental.	Mayer	argues	 that	 the	decision	 in	Van	Gend	en	Loos	 is	not	 likely	 to	
have	 seemed	 that	 dramatic	 to	 the	 judges	 at	 the	 time	 and	 was	 simply	 an	 attempt	 at	 creating	 a	
conceptual	 and	 methodological	 way	 of	 working	 which	 was	 ‘detached	 from	 classical	 public	
international	law	constraints’.23	Mayer	points	to	the	fact	that	the	decision	in	Van	Gend	en	Loos	and	
its	consequences	are	perhaps	not	that	far	removed	from	the	views	on	European	integration	of	the	
six	Member	States	at	the	time	and	draws	attention	to	a	1963	case	note	by	Ophüls24	who	states	that	
the	 Court	 simply	 reiterated	 the	 ‘predominant	 view’.	 However,	 it	 is	 equally	 likely	 that	 the	 legal	
revolution	brought	about	by	this	series	of	cases	was	accidental.	As	Rasmussen	points	out,	Van	Gend	
was	‘a	narrow	decision	that	depended	on	two	new	judges	whose	nomination	less	than	a	year	before	
had	been	far	from	straightforward’.25		
Whether	 or	 not	 Van	 Gend	 en	 Loos	was	 intended	 to	 transform	 the	 legal	 order,	 the	 case	 certainly	
changed	the	legal	landscape.	Arguably,	the	cases	that	came	next	were	less	about	transformation	and	
more	 about	 an	 evolution	 which	 consolidated	 the	 position	 established	 by	 Van	 Gend	 en	 Loos.	 The	
principles	 they	 established	 were	 presented	 on	 a	 case	 by	 case	 basis	 making	 the	 changes	 appear	
incremental	 and	 less	 radical.26	 For	 example	 the	 decisions	 on	 state	 liability	 came,	 for	 some,	 as	
another	 transformation	 and	 radical	 shift	 in	 how	 EU	 law	 should	 operate	 and	 how	Member	 States	
should	be	held	to	account	for	breaches	of	their	obligations.	However,	there	is	considerable	evidence	
that	this	decision	should	not	have	come	as	such	a	surprise.	The	Court	had	already	held	that	Member	
States	must	make	 good	 any	unlawful	 consequences	 of	 a	 breach	of	 Community	 law,27	 and	 a	 little	
later,	 in	 1973,	 the	 Court	 declared	 admissible	 an	 action	 for	 infringement	 of	 Member	 States’	
obligations	even	though	the	Member	State	had	remedied	 the	situation.28	Admissibility	was	based	
on	 the	possible	 interest	 to	 an	 individual	 in	 relation	 to a	Member	 State’s	 responsibility	while	 they	
were	in	breach.	From	there	to	state	liability	is	a	very	small	evolutionary,	rather	than	transformative,	
step.	
 
 
 
																																								 																				
22	J.	Kooiman,	Governing	as	Governance,	(London:	Sage,	2003)	and	Tömmel,	‘EU	Governance	of	Governance’.	
23	Franz	C.	Mayer,	‘Van	Gend	en	Loos:	The	Foundation	of	a	Community	of	Law’,	in	Miguel	P	Maduro	and	Loic	Azoulai	(eds),	
The	Past	and	Future	of	EU	Law,	(Oxford:	Hart	Publishing,	2010),	at	21.	
24	Carl	F.	Ophüls,	‘Anmerkung	zum	Urteil	des	EuGH	vom	5.2.1963	-	Rechtssache	26/62	‘Neue	Juristische	Wochenschrift,	16,	
(1963):	1751.	
25	Morten	 Rasmussen,	 ‘From	Costa	 v	 ENEL	 to	 the	 Treaties	 of	 Rome:	 A	 Brief	 History	 of	 a	 Legal	 Revolution’,	 in	Miguel	 P	
Maduro	and	Loic	Azoulai	(eds),	The	Past	and	Future	of	EU	Law,	(Oxford:	Hart	Publishing,	2010),	at	83.	
26	M.	Shapiro	‘The	European	Court	of	Justice’,	in	Paul	Craig	and	Grainne	De	Burca	(eds),	The	Evolution	of	EU	Law,	(Oxford:	
Oxford	University	Press,	1999).	
27	Case	C6/60	Humblet	v	Belgium	[1961]	ECR	1128.	
28	Case	39/72	Commission	v	Italy	[1973]	ECR	101.	
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TRANSFORMING	NATIONAL	LEGAL	ORDERS:	THE	ACCEPTANCE	OF	EU	LAW	
The	relationship	between	EU	law	and	national	law	and	Member	State	politics	is	not	based	solely	on	
the	ECJ’s	activities	but	also	depends	on	how	Member	States	have	reacted	to	and	engaged	with	the	
EU	 legal	 framework	 over	 time.	 This	 part	 of	 the	 article	 briefly	 considers	 the	 preliminary	 reference	
procedure	as	a	vital	part	of	this	relationship.	In	this	context,	it	has	been	noted	that	‘one	of	the	most	
important	 aspects	 of	 the	 Court’s	 contribution	 has	 been	 its	 characterization	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 EU	 and	 national	 law’.29	 In	 what	 Mancini	 called	 an	 ‘exercise	 of	 remarkable	 judicial	
creativity’,30	 the	Court	distanced	 itself	 from	established	 international	 law	principles	and	developed	
an	 ‘organic	 connection	between	 the	Court	of	 Justice	and	 the	national	Courts’31	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	
preliminary	 reference	 procedure.	 As	 well	 as	 being	 important	 for	 the	 development	 of	 ECJ	
jurisprudence	 and	 its	 political	 and	 legal	 credibility	 because	 it	 provides	 a	 link	 between	 the	 EU	 and	
national	Courts	and	encourages	the	 interpretation	of	key	 legal	concepts,	the	preliminary	reference	
procedure	 and	 the	 way	 it	 has	 been	 used	 also	 helps	 explain	 the	 development	 of	 EU	 law	 in	 the	
Member	States	and	their	acceptance	of	it.	
For	more	than	40	years,	this	system	has	successfully	managed	the	myriad	complexities	
of	 legal	 integration.	 It	 has	 also	 heavily	 conditioned	 legislative	 outcomes	 in	 a	 wide	
range	 of	 policy	 domains,	 and	 it	 has	 helped	 to	 determine	 the	 course	 of	 European	
integration	more	generally.	But	the	system	has	never	been	‘perfected’.	It	has	evolved	
continuously,	 often	 unpredictably,	 in	 response	 to	 a	 steady	 stream	 of	 challenges	 to	
supremacy	arising	from	litigation	of	EC	law	in	national	Courts.32		
It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article	to	describe	and	explain	the	preliminary	reference	procedure	in	
detail,	suffice	it	to	say	that	in	hearing	preliminary	references	from	national	Courts,	the	ECJ	interprets	
the	 law	 and	 answers	 the	 exact	 questions	 referred.	 The	 national	 Courts	must	 then	 apply	 the	 law,	
following	the	ECJ’s	guidance,	to	the	factual	situation	before	them.	
As	well	as	making	the	enforcement	of	EU	law	rather	more	practical	than	leaving	it	to	EU	institutions,	
allowing	the	national	legal	systems	to	take	on	the	role	of	adjudicating	EU	law	rights	has	a	profound	
impact	on	EU	integration	and	governance.	One	reason	the	ECJ	has	been	so	successful	in	driving	EU	
integration	 forward	and	developing	policy	areas	 is	 the	 relatively	high	number	of	 cases	brought	by	
citizens	 which	 raise	 EU	 law	 questions,	 have	 been	 referred	 to	 the	 ECJ	 and	 which	 have	 therefore	
allowed	the	ECJ	to	interpret	areas	as	it	sees	fit.33	However,	for	the	EU	legal	system	to	develop	in	the	
way	that	it	did,	it	had	to	be	accepted	by	the	Courts	of	the	Member	States.	The	preliminary	reference	
procedure	 gives	Member	 States’	 Courts	 a	 stake	 in	 the	 proceedings.	 Or	 put	 differently,	 it	 co-opts	
them	into	the	EU	legal	system,	making	them	part	of	it.	That	is	not	to	say	though	that	national	Courts	
accepted	the	ECJ’s	jurisdiction	without	any	conflict	at	all.	Given	Member	States’	concerns	about	the	
loss	of	sovereignty	to	the	EU,	it	is	not	surprising	that	Courts	across	Member	States	were	also	a	little	
wary	of	the	ECJ	and	 its	role,	or	rather	the	 impact	the	ECJ	would	have	on	their	role.	As	the	highest	
Courts	in	Member	States,	and	often	the	only	Courts	with	jurisdiction	over	questions	of	constitutional	
law,	many	of	the	Constitutional	or	Supreme	Courts	across	the	EU	were	reluctant	to	refer	questions	
to	the	ECJ,	sometimes	even	explicitly	reserving	the	right	to	decide	such	questions	for	themselves	and	
ignoring	 the	principle	of	 supremacy	of	 EU	 law.	 There	was,	 and	 to	 some	extent	 still	 is,	 therefore	 a	
power	 struggle	 between	 the	 highest	 Member	 State	 Courts	 and	 the	 ECJ	 as	 to	 who	 can	 define	
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important	 constitutional	 principles	 and	 decide	 key	 cases,	 and	 who,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 potentially	
unpopular	decisions,	is	willing	to	do	so.34	Overall	though,	‘in	practice,	the	relationship	between	the	
Court	of	Justice	and	the	national	Courts,	including	supreme	Courts,	has	worked	reasonably	well’.35		
However,	 there	 is	 also	 another	 power	 struggle	 to	 consider;	 one	 which	 is	 inherent	 in	 every	 legal	
system	which	has	an	appellate	structure	and	which	 in	this	case	goes	some	way	towards	explaining	
how	the	EU	legal	order	became	incorporated	into	national	legal	systems.	This	is	the	power	struggle	
between	lower	Courts	and	higher	Courts	in	the	Member	States.	Being	able	to	refer	questions	of	EU	
law	 to	 the	 ECJ	 gives	 lower	 Courts	 considerable	 power	 and	 the	 ECJ	 has	 always	 protected	 lower	
Courts’	right	to	refer.	By	giving	the	lower	Courts	a	stake	in	the	EU	legal	order,	the	ECJ	has	avoided	
constant	 power	 struggles	with	 supreme	or	 constitutional	 Courts	 and	 has	 opened	 an	 avenue	 for	 a	
steady	stream	of	cases	which	 in	 turn	normalises	 the	process	and	 leads	to	acceptance	of	EU	 law	 in	
Member	 States.	 It,	 of	 course,	 also	 leads	 to	 increased	 judicialisation	 of	 EU	 integration	 and	
policymaking	because	it	is	the	ECJ,	through	the	national	Courts,	which	is	expanding	the	scope	of	EU	
law	and	policy.	The	statistics	show	that	in	most	Member	States,	significantly	more	references	come	
from	courts	other	than	the	highest	 level	or	constitutional	Courts.36	The	focus	of	defining	 law,	 legal	
principles	and	their	scope	thus	shifts	away	from	law	makers	and	to	the	Courts,	firmly	embedding	the	
ECJ’s	role	within	governance	structures.		
	
THE	WORK	GOES	ON:	TRANSFORMATIVE	EVOLUTION?	
So	far	this	article	has	considered	the	initial	transformation	and	subsequent	evolution	of	the	EU	legal	
order.	It	then	considered	one	of	the	key	processes	and	its	use	by	the	ECJ	in	ensuring	Member	State	
acceptance	of	the	European	legal	order	and	EU	law	more	generally.	The	final	question	to	consider	is	
whether	the	ECJ	has	continued	to	transform	the	legal	order	it	created.	In	this	final	part	of	the	article,	
I	argue	that	although	there	have	been	several	decisions	which	have	had	significant	impacts	in	their	
respective	 substantive	 areas	 such	 as	 Baumbast37	 or	 recently	 Zambrano38	 (closely	 followed	 by	
McCarthy39	and	Dereci40)	in	relation	to	citizenship,	Coleman41	in	relation	to	discrimination	law,	and	
Hoefner	v	Macroton	GmbH42	 in	 relation	to	competition	 law	for	example,	 there	have	not	been	any	
decisions	which	have	made	significant	changes	to	the	legal	order	itself.	Since	Van	Gend	en	Loos,	the	
legal	order	has	 remained	 fairly	static	with	 the	ECJ	claiming	authority	 to	define	 important	concepts	
and	questions	and	extending	the	reach	of	direct	effect	into	more	and	more	areas.	However,	some	of	
its	decisions	do	have	a	significant	impact	on	questions	of	governance.	
The	 citizenship	 jurisprudence,	 for	 example,	 provides	 an	 example	 of	 the	 ECJ’s	 expansive	
interpretations	 of	 EU	 law	 and	 its	 willingness	 or	 even	 desire	 to	 push	 the	 development	 forward	
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incrementally	in	spite	of	considerable	Member	State	resistance.43	A	further	example	can	be	found	in	
relation	 to	 the	 fiscal	 compact.	 Since	 March	 2012,	 the	 ECJ,	 through	 the	 Treaty	 on	 Stability,	
Coordination	and	Governance,	has	the	power	to	enforce	Member	States’	commitment	to	the	‘fiscal	
compact’	section	of	the	Treaty.	While	the	legal	order	itself	is	not	affected	by	this	as	such,	the	step	is	
potentially	transformative.	As	Chalmers	notes,	
Policing	 the	 constitutional	 retrenchment	 of	 public	 finances	 is	 an	 unusual	 role	 for	 a	
Court.	 However,	 in	 the	 ECJ’s	 case	 it	 is	 not	 a	 one-off	 role,	 and	 the	 new	 task	 is	
symptomatic	 of	 the	 Court	 moving	 increasingly	 to	 centre	 stage	 in	 fiscal	 and	 welfare	
policy-making	within	the	European	Union.44	
The	development	of	competition	law	in	the	EU	provides	another	useful	example	as	to	how	the	ECJ	
drives	the	evolution	of	the	legal	order	and	the	transformation	of	policy	areas	forward.	Elsewhere	in	
this	 special	 issue,	 Sandra	 Eckert	 provides	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 regulatory	 governance	 in	 the	
energy	 and	 competition	 sectors	which	 provides	 valuable	 insights.45	 Suffice	 it	 to	 say	 here	 that	 the	
ECJ’s	acceptance	of	soft	law	instruments	allows	and	facilitates	the	coming	together	of	various	modes	
of	 governance	 mixing	 the	 traditional	 community	 method	 with	 new	 modes	 of	 governance,	 and	
placing	 soft	 law	 instruments	on	a	 firm	constitutional	 footing	using	general	 legal	principles	 such	as	
legal	 certainty.46 The	 ECJ	 has	 therefore	 acknowledged	 and	 accepted	 the	 multi-level,	 often	 non-
hierarchical	modes	of	governance	discussed	in	detail	in	Ingeborg	Tömmel’s	contribution.		
	It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article	to	explore	all	of	these	areas	and	indeed	the	contributions	to	this	
special	 issue	explore	some	of	 the	most	 relevant	questions	 in	greater	detail,	but	exploring	some	of	
these	areas	provides	an	insight	into	how	and	why	the	ECJ’s	jurisprudence	continues	to	be	important	
for	questions	of	governance	in	the	EU.	
One	such	area	where	the	ECJ	has	transformed	the	legal	landscape	across	the	Member	States	is	that	
of	 gender	 equality.	 Prechal	 commented:	 ‘Gender	 equality	 law	 has	 played	 a	 pivotal	 –	 in	 many	
respects	pioneer	–	role	in	the	field	of	enforcement	of	Community	law	in	general	and	in	particular	for	
the	protection	of	 rights,	which	 individuals	derive	 from	that	 law’.47	This	area	 therefore	serves	as	a	
useful	 example	 to	 illustrate	 the	 ECJ’s	 transformational	 role	 and	 explore	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 this	
transformation	 is	 part	 of	 a	 grand	 plan	 to	 drive	 EU	 integration	 and	 favour	 particular	 modes	 of	
governance.	The	case	of	Defrenne	II48	provided	the	first	example	of	directly	effective	Treaty	rights	
being	 enforceable	 against	 a	 private	 institution	 (or	 person)	 rather	 than	 a	Member	 State	 and	 as	 a	
result	citizens	benefit	from	a	highly	effective	mechanism	to	enforce	EU	Law	rights	through	national	
Courts.	The	impact	on	governance	is	clear:	cases	result	in	national	legislation	which	is	under	scrutiny	
being	changed	and	 laws	 in	other	Member	States	also	being	reviewed.	 In	MacCarthys	Ltd	v	Smith49	
the	English	Equal	Pay	Act	1970	was	shown	to	be	incompatible	with	EU	law	and	had	to	be	changed	
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and	a	series	of	cases	following	on	from	that	clarified	the	 important	aspects	of	gender	equality	 law	
(Bilka	Kaufhaus	GmbH,50	Kalanke	51	 and	Marschall52).	The	 ripple	effect	of	 those	decisions	was	 felt	
across	the	EU	and	had	a	significant	impact	on	gender	equality	law	at	the	national	level53	resulting	in	
increasing	integration,	the	potential	for	further	litigation	and	thus	increasing	judicialisation.	
Undoubtedly,	the	case	law	of	the	ECJ	has	transformed	gender	equality	law	but	was	this	deliberate?	
Jo	Shaw	notes	that	the	Court	has	‘cloaked	itself	in	something	akin	to	a	feminist	cloak	almost	always	
only	 where	 some	 gain	 can	 be	 obtained	 in	 terms	 of	 reinforcing	 its	 own	 legitimacy	 within	 the	
system’.54	 The	move	 to	 transform	equality	 law	 in	Defrenne	 II55	and	 cases	 that	 followed	may	 thus	
have	 rather	 more	 to	 do	 with	 the	 ECJ’s	 awareness	 of	 its	 own	 position	 within	 the	 EU	 institutional	
framework	than	with	a	predominant	concern	with	gender	equality.56	The	ECJ	has	clearly	shown	an	
awareness	of	its	position	and	the	possibility	that	its	powers	may	be	limited	by	Treaty	and	that	there	
is	 thus	 a	 need	 to	 safeguard	 its	 position	 and	 not	 be	 seen	 to	 make	 decisions	 with	 significant	 and	
potentially	 costly	 consequences	 for	 Member	 States.	 Once	 such	 balancing	 act	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	
cases	relating	to	pensions	and	equal	pay.57	Once	the	ECJ	had	concluded	that	Article	119	had	direct	
effect	and	that	occupational	pensions	were	included	in	the	definitions	of	pay,	the	Council	attempted	
to	 limit	 the	 severe	 financial	 consequences	 for	 many	 employers	 by	 issuing	 Directive	 86/37858	 on	
pensions	 which	 gave	 Member	 States	 time	 to	 implement	 the	 effects	 of	 equal	 pay	 legislation	 on	
pensions.	 In	 Barber	 v	 Guardian	 Royal	 Exchange,59	 the	 ECJ	 essentially	 overruled	 that	 Directive	 by	
stating	 that	 differences	 in	 pensionable	 age	 based	 on	 sex	 were	 discriminatory	 and	 had	 to	 be	
eliminated;	 the	 ECJ	 did	 however	 limit	 the	 retrospective	 effect	 of	 that	 decision.	 Nonetheless,	 the	
Member	 States’	 governments	 reacted	 strongly	 to	 a	 decision	 with	 potentially	 crippling	 financial	
implications	for	employers,	they	added	a	protocol	to	the	Maastricht	Treaty60	and	that	protocol	limits	
the	application	of	the	principle	of	equal	treatment	to	any	work	after	the	Barber	decision.	The	ECJ	did	
get	 the	 opportunity	 to	 respond61	 and	 could,	 arguably,	 have	 decided	 to	 fight	 back.	 However,	 the	
possibility	of	 jeopardising	its	future	position	and	the	future	acceptance	of	ECJ	jurisprudence	meant	
that,	instead,	the	ECJ	accepted	the	protocol.	‘In	effect	the	Court’s	ruling	said:	’this	is	what	we	meant	
all	along.	The	member	governments	did	not	overrule	us;	they	simply	helped	us	clarify	a	point’’.62	The	
balancing	 act	 did	 not	 stop	 there	 though.	 It	 seems	 likely	 that	 the	 EU	Member	 State	 governments	
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intended	 to	 limit	 the	 application	of	Article	 119	 generally	 but	 the	 ECJ	 held	 in	 two	 cases63	 that	 the	
retrospective	application	of	the	principle	of	equal	treatment	was	not	limited	in	relation	to	the	right	
to	join	an	occupational	pension	scheme	and	claims	to	do	so	could	therefore	be	backdated.	The	ECJ	
did,	however,	give	Member	States	a	way	of	limiting	claims	by	holding	that	claimants	would	have	to	
pay	their	historical	contribution	in	order	to	join	the	scheme	retroactively	so	while	the	decisions	are	
theoretically	 far	 reaching	 and	 supportive	 of	 gender	 equality,	 they	 are	 quite	 limited	 in	 practice,	
making	them	more	acceptable	to	the	Member	States.		
This	series	of	cases	shows	the	power	play	between	EU	institutions	and	between	the	ECJ	and	Member	
States	which	 sees	 the	 ECJ	 pushing	 the	 limits	 of	what	Member	 States	will	 accept	 but	 not	 pushing	
beyond	 those	 limits	 and	 risking	 a	 significant	 push	 back	 which	 may	 limit	 its	 power	 in	 the	 future.	
Nonetheless,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	ECJ	has	been	instrumental	in	shifting	the	focus	of	EU	policy	
by	changing	the	weight	afforded	to	different	 issues	and	by	 insisting	on	expansive	 interpretation	of	
concepts	 such	 as	 pay,	 even	 if	 allowing	 the	 application	 of	 those	 principles	 to	 be	 time	 limited.	 The	
earlier	 economic	 focus	 of	 decisions	 gave	 way	 to	 social	 policy	 concerns	 with	 the	 ECJ	 declaring	 in	
Deutsche	Telekom	AG	that:	
the	 economic	 aim	 pursued	 by	 Article	 141	 of	 the	 treaty	 [on	 equal	 pay],	 namely	 the	
elimination	of	distortion	of	competition	between	undertakings	established	in	different	
Member	States	 is	 secondary	 to	 the	social	aim	pursued	by	 the	same	provision,	which	
constitutes	the	expression	of	a	fundamental	human	right.64		
The	 ECJ	 is	 a	 strategic	 player	 in	 the	 institutional	 set	 up	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 has	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	
shaping	law	and	policy,	the	cases	above	are	one	illustration	of	that.	
Finally,	the	ECJ’s	approach	to	human	rights	issues	is	worth	mentioning	as	this	is	widely	predicted	to	
be	the	next	area	for	significant	legal	development	in	the	EU	context.	With	the	EU’s	accession	to	the	
European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	and	its	own	Charter	annexed	to	the	Treaties,	the	ECJ	 is	set	
increasingly	to	decide	on	matters	of	Human	Rights	and	is	likely	to	decide	them	in	a	different	way	to	
their	previous	approach.	As	Stone	Sweet	points	out,	 ‘lawyers	and	 judges	will	be	more	comfortable	
working	with	a	codified	text	than	with	unwritten	general	principles’,65	which	governed	this	area	until	
recently.	 The	 result	might	well	 be	 increased	 rights-based	 litigation,	 thus	 increasing	 judicialisation.	
This	area	also	serves	as	an	example	of	how	the	ECJ	continues	to	try	and	safeguard	its	position	in	the	
institutional	 framework	and	 to	 try	and	ensure	 that	decisions	 remain	open	 to	 judicial	 scrutiny.	 The	
opinion	on	the	EU’s	accession	to	the	European	Convention,	delivered	by	a	 full	Court	at	 the	end	of	
2014,	 gives	 us	 some	 insight.66	 The	 ECJ	 notes	 that	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (ECtHR)	
jurisprudence	would	be	binding	on	all	EU	institutions	including	the	ECJ	and	that	the	ECJ’s	rulings	on	
human	rights	issues	could	not	bind	the	ECtHR.	However,	the	ECJ	pointed	out	that	this	‘cannot	be	so	
as	 regards	 the	 interpretation	 which	 the	 Court	 itself	 provides	 of	 EU	 law	 and,	 in	 particular,	 of	 the	
Charter	of	 Fundamental	Rights	of	 the	European	Union’.67	 The	ECJ	went	on	 to	 consider	 the	 lack	of	
arrangements	 for	 dealing	 with	 the	 overlap	 in	 jurisdiction	 between	 the	 Courts	 and	 points	 to	 the	
possibility	 of	 undermining	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 preliminary	 reference	 procedure	 and	 the	
effectiveness	 of	 EU	 law	 overall.	 On	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 ECtHR	 can	 rule	 on	 questions	 in	
which	the	ECJ	has	had	prior	involvement,	the	ECJ	commented:	‘[t]o	permit	the	ECtHR	to	rule	on	such	
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a	 question	 would	 be	 tantamount	 to	 conferring	 on	 it	 jurisdiction	 to	 interpret	 the	 case	 law	 of	 the	
Court	of	Justice’.68	The	ECJ	also	seems	less	than	impressed	that	the	ECtHR,	as	the	law	now	stands,	
would	 have	 jurisdiction	 to	 review	 certain	 acts/omissions	 which	 the	 ECJ	 currently	 does	 not	 have	
jurisdiction	 to	 review	 (mainly	 acts	 and	 omissions	 relating	 to	 Common	 Foreign	 and	 Security	 Policy	
matters)	noting	that:	
[t]he	 Court	 has	 already	 had	 occasion	 to	 find	 that	 jurisdiction	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 judicial	
review	 of	 acts,	 actions	 or	 omissions	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 EU,	 including	 in	 the	 light	 of	
fundamental	rights,	cannot	be	conferred	exclusively	on	an	international	court	which	is	
outside	the	institutional	and	judicial	framework	of	the	EU.69		
The	ECJ	is	asserting	its	position	vis-à-vis	the	ECtHR	and	highlighting	that	it	sees	the	interpretation	of	
the	ECHR	as	part	of	its	remit.	The	power	play	between	the	Courts	and	between	the	EU	institutions	
and	the	Courts	will	provide	a	rich	area	for	research	in	the	future	and	will	go	some	way	to	highlight	
the	extent	to	which	the	ECJ	continues	to	be	transformational.		
The	preceding	examples	have	given	an	insight	into	how	the	ECJ	seems	to	be	transforming	EU	law	and	
policy	areas	even	where	the	legal	order	remains	static.	Shifts	in	focus	on	substantive	areas	are	partly	
due	 to	 questions	 being	 posed	 by	 Member	 States’	 Courts	 but	 are	 also	 influenced	 by	 the	 ECJ’s	
approach	 to	 the	 questions	 posed	 and	 the	 decisions	 they	 make	 as	 decisions	 are	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	
further	legal	development	and	possibly	litigation.70		
The	ECJ’s	reach	is	wide	in	scope.	There	are	no	policy	areas	with	which	the	Court	has	not	in	some	way	
engaged.	 As	 Jacobs	 notes,	 the	 EU	 ‘is	 based	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 to	 a	 far	 greater	 extent	 than	 any	
previous	or	contemporary	international	or	transnational	organisation’.71	That	emphasis	on	the	rule	
of	law	and	the	importance	of	law	in	the	expansion	of	the	EU’s	remit,	has	led	to	policy	areas	evolving	
over	 time	on	a	case	by	case	basis	as	 legal	arguments	have	built	on	previous	ones	and	 the	ECJ	has	
based	its	decisions	on	precedent.	However,	there	are	some	decisions	which	have	transformed	policy	
areas	or	at	least	had	the	potential	to	do	so	even	in	circumstances	where	there	is	no	transformation	
of	governance	structures	or	the	legal	order,	individual	decisions	do	very	much	matter	for	individual	
policy	areas	and	ultimately	also	for	how	governance	operates.		
	
CONCLUSION	
‘The	EU	provides	one	of	the	most	important	examples	of	extensive	judicialisation	ever	documented	
across	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 policy	 areas’.72	 There	 are	 clearly	 elements	 of	 what	 Kelemen	 has	 termed	
Eurolegalism.	The	importance	of	the	ECJ	and	of	litigation	in	shaping	the	EU	legal	system	should	not	
be	underestimated.	The	ECJ	transformed	the	treaties	into	something	far	more	relevant	to	Member	
States	and	their	citizens	than	they	would	otherwise	have	been	and	thus	opened	the	(flood)	gates	for	
litigation	on	EU	law	issues.	This	article	has	illustrated	how	the	early	decisions	of	the	ECJ	transformed	
the	 legal	 order	 completely	 by	 declaring	 EU	 law	 supreme,	 directly	 applicable	 and	 often	 directly	
effective	 and	 then	making	Member	 States	 liable	 for	 breaches	of	 their	 obligations.	Once	 that	 legal	
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order	 had	 been	 established,	 it	 was	 accepted	 by	 Member	 States	 partly	 because	 of	 the	 way	 the	
preliminary	reference	procedure	has	been	used	by	the	ECJ	to	protect	lower	national	Courts’	rights	to	
refer	questions,	 thus	giving	them	and	citizens	a	stake	 in	the	functioning	of	the	EU	 legal	order.	 It	 is	
therefore	 likely	 that	 the	 ECJ	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 instigating	 what	 Tömmel73	 has	 considered	 the	
second	 phase	 of	 governance.	 Without	 the	 ECJ’s	 actions	 it	 would	 have	 been	 impossible	 for	
integration	to	move	forward	in	the	way	that	it	did,	perhaps	resulting	instead	in	it	doing	so	away	from	
the	political	gaze	and	in	a	rather	more	hidden	fashion.	Arguably,	the	Court	then	also	paved	the	way	
for	the	third	phase	as	integration	had	progressed	to	such	a	point	where	deliberate	liberalisation	of	
the	 market	 was	 possible.	 Finally,	 the	 article	 considered	 whether	 the	 ECJ	 continues	 to	 be	
transformational	 and	 concluded	 that	 while	 it	 might	 continue	 to	 transform	 policy	 areas,	 the	 legal	
order	 itself	has	remained	static.	That	 is	not	to	say	that	the	ECJ	 is	no	 longer	relevant	 in	governance	
terms,	it	continues	to	drive	forward	EU	integration	in	many	areas	and	influence	the	development	of	
law	and	policy	across	the	Member	States.	
***	
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